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CPS-317 PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4599
________________
RICHARD A. WASHINGTON,
              Appellant
   v.
RAYMOND J. SOBINA, SUPERINTENDENT;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF
PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-CV-07474 )
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action 
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 31, 2006
2Before:  Barry, Smith and Nygaard Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 11, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
I.
This appeal raises the question of whether a claim
alleging the denial of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial is waived upon entry of a guilty plea.  We agree with
several of our sister courts of appeal and hold that a speedy trial
issue is non-jurisdictional and is therefore waived by an
unconditional guilty plea.
       The procedural background of this case was well1
documented by the District Court in Washington v. Sobina, 387
F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 2005). We therefore only summarize
the facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
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II.1
In 1995, Richard Washington was arrested and charged
on several counts relating to the kidnaping of Asha Woodall and
the murder of Anthony Carney in Philadelphia County.  The first
trial ended in a mistrial.  At his second trial in 1998, Washington
was convicted by a jury of criminal conspiracy, possession of an
instrument of crime, and robbery of a vehicle.  He was found not
guilty of first degree murder and other charges.  The jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the kidnaping and lesser degree of
murder charges.  Washington was sentenced to a cumulative
term of five to ten years imprisonment on the three counts of
conviction.
While awaiting retrial on the kidnapping and murder
       Washington had previously filed a habeas petition in the2
District Court that was dismissed for lack of exhaustion.
4
charges, Washington filed petitions in both the Pennsylvania
Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court alleging
violations of his state and constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
Both petitions were denied.  In September 2002, Washington
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, alleging denial of his Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial and his due process right to a speedy appeal.2
Meanwhile, in 2003 Washington’s third trial on the murder and
kidnaping charges ended in a hung jury.
In 2005, the District Court granted the writ on the speedy
appeal claim conditioned upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court
deciding Washington’s direct appeal.  On the speedy trial claim,
the court denied the writ but granted a certificate of
       Upon Washington’s motion, appointed counsel withdrew3
and Washington is proceeding pro se.
5
appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).  Washington v.
Sobina, 387 F. Supp. 2d 460, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  The
Commonwealth appealed the conditional grant of partial relief,
Washington v. Sobina, C.A. No. 05-4522, and Washington filed
the instant cross-appeal of the denial of his speedy trial claim.3
During the pendency of this appeal, Washington pled
guilty to kidnaping and third degree murder, and was sentenced
to an aggregate term of seven and a half to 20 years
imprisonment to run concurrently with the sentence previously
imposed.  The Commonwealth filed a motion to summarily
dismiss the appeal as moot.  Washington filed a response in
opposition.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may
take summary action only if there is no substantial question
6presented or if a subsequent precedent or change in
circumstances warrants such action.  Third Circuit Internal
Operating Procedure 10.6. 
III.
It is well established that a criminal defendant’s
unconditional, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives all
non-jurisdictional issues.  Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d
959, 964 (3d Cir. 1970);  Abram v. United States, 398 F.2d 350
(3d Cir. 1968); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,
658 n.3 (1992) (finding no waiver where defendant preserved
right to appeal).  “A guilty plea . . . renders irrelevant those
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way
of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”  Menna v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975).  This includes “many of
the most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution,”
       The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is made4
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1219.
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United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995), such as
the right to a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination, United States
v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial protects an
individual from the deprivation of personal liberty from the time
he is arrested or criminally charged through to sentencing.
Hakeem v. Beyer,  990 F.2d 750, 762 (3d Cir. 1993);  Burkett v.
Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987).   The primary4
purpose of this right is not to prevent prejudice to the
defendant’s ability to present a defense, but rather to “minimize
the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce
8the . . . impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while
released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.”  United
States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).  Thus, a speedy trial
claim alleges that the inherent delay between arrest and
conviction has risen to an unacceptable level, and as such the
claim is not inconsistent with the “establishment of factual
guilt.”  Menna, supra; see also United States v. O’Donnell, 539
F.2d 1233, 1237 (9  Cir. 1976) (recognizing that although ath
Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation precludes establishing
guilt by trial, it is not logically inconsistent with validly
established guilt), superceded on other grounds as recognized by
United States v. Smith, 60 F.3d 595 (9  Cir. 1995).th
Furthermore, a jurisdictional claim implicates the trial
court’s “statutory or constitutional power to hear a case.”
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (emphasis in
9original).  The Pennsylvania trial courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over criminal proceedings by virtue of prima facie
evidence that a violation of Pennsylvania’s criminal code
occurred within the county of trial.  Commonwealth v. McNeil,
665 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 1995); see also
Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003)
(discussing statutory and constitutional basis for jurisdiction of
courts of common pleas).  To invoke this power, the trial court
must present the defendant with a “formal and specific
accusation of the crimes charged.”  McNeil, 665 A.2d at 1251.
The guarantee of a speedy trial does not implicate this authority.
Accordingly, we agree with our sister courts that have
concluded that the right to a speedy trial is non-jurisdictional,
and is therefore waived by an unconditional and voluntary guilty
plea.  See United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 (2d Cir.
1996) (recognizing that because the right to a speedy trial is
10
non-jurisdictional, a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives
a speedy trial claim unless the claim is specifically reserved for
appeal);  Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 850 (5  Cir. 1993)th
(holding that because all non-jurisdictional defects are waived
upon entry of a guilty plea, defendant waived alleged violation
of right to a speedy trial);  Cox v. Lockhart, 970 F.2d 448, 453
(8th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant’s knowing and voluntary
guilty plea waived his right to a speedy trial);  O’Donnell, 539
F.2d at 1237 (same);  United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 796
(11  Cir. 1984) (holding that right to speedy trial is non-th
jurisdictional, and thus defendant’s guilty plea foreclosed raising
speedy trial claim on appeal).
IV.
Washington’s plea was unconditional.  See Transcript of
May 9, 2006.  Accordingly, we conclude that Washington
       We reject Washington’s argument that the delay between5
his first three trials raises a speedy trial claim independent of the
delay between his third trial and guilty plea, and as such
survives any waiver.  “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the
chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.
When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea.”  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267 (1973).
We also recognize that during the plea colloquy
Washington expressly waived his speedy trial claim and upon
further questioning acknowledged that this pending collateral
appeal of his speedy trial claim was moot.  See Transcript of
May 9, 2006 at 22-26. 
       We decline at this time to address Washington’s challenge6
to the voluntariness of his plea.  See Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule . . . that a federal
appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon
11
waived his speedy trial claim when he entered a guilty plea.   As5
this change in circumstances disposes of the speedy trial claim
and there is no other substantial question presented on this
appeal,  we will grant the Commonwealth’s motion and6
below.”).                                              12
summarily dismiss the appeal.  See Third Circuit Internal
Operating Procedure 10.6.
